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Biometric picture at passports juts countyr's think tesetd they scnas himeslf scanning macihne, scanenr is 100 percent possible," said Laurie. "The passport bit is the more difficult. You would have to buy one from a professional forger or some means, but adding the chip is something we could do ourselves using off the shelf equipment using $100 investment."

The problem, in part, is that each country has its own security signature for verifying its own biometric passports. While some share that information, many countries do not, making it easy to exploit the loopholes, said Laurie.

"I probably couldn't produce a fake UK passport that would successfully cross into the UK because I'm sure the UK is actually able to check its own signatures," Laurie said.

"But I may be able to produce a passport from some other country and use it on an automated system to enter the UK and the UK wouldn't be able to check the signatures because they don't have them."

An international system coordinating the various security signatures is needed, said Van Beek.

"If you want to make the system more secure then all countries need to have access to a list of all certificates of all countries all over the world. If that's in place, if that list is used by all countries and all inspection systems, that might help to detect non-genuine documents and non-genuine chips," said Van Beek
]]

